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 1. Introduction 
 
 US post-war suburbanization has reshaped the spatial pattern of growth in many metropolitan 
areas as many factors interact to generate urban sprawl. Population growth combined with individual 
housing preferences, higher income levels, a reduction in transport costs and an improvement in road 
networks have ensured that the demand for land at the urban fringes is in a constant state of growth 
(Mieskowski and Mills, 1993; Brueckner and Fansler, 1983; Brueckner, 2000, 2001; McGrath, 2005; 
Baum-Snow, 2007; Wassmer, 2008). In parallel with these forces, increasing political fragmentation 
(Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2002), aspects of the physical geography (Burchfield et al., 2006), certain 
subsidy programs, public investment policies and land-use regulations (Glaeser and Kahn, 2004; McGuire 
and Sjoquist, 2002) have also been instrumental1.  
 
 This rapid suburbanization has created many of the challenges that US cities face today, ranging 
from traffic congestion, air pollution and a loss of amenity benefits from open space to the weakening of 
agglomeration economies and economies of scale in the production of local public services. Claims are 
also made that sprawl induces the movement of large shares of population and employment to suburban 
communities, thereby contributing to socioeconomic segregation between the suburban rich and the inner 
city poor2. This predominantly “white flight” of the middle- and upper-income classes has given rise to 
many poverty-related problems in downtown neighborhoods, including increasing crime rates, poor-
quality public services, a shortage of fiscal resources and a lack of reinvestment and maintenance in 
existing building structures, resulting in the deterioration and decay of central cities. These inner-city 
problems promote even further population shift toward the suburbs, reinforcing the process of suburban 
growth and urban decay (Bradford and Kelejian, 1973; Mills and Price, 1984; Mieskowski and Mills, 
1993). 
 
It is not surprising, then, that the problem of central city urban decay has become a matter of 
concern throughout US metropolitan areas. Interest in blight is not, however, of recent origin. Indeed, 
early writers on blight and urban renewal stressed the complex relationships between central city and 
suburban development (see, for instance, Fisher, 1942; Breger, 1967; Davis, 1960; Davis and Whinston, 
1961; Bradbury, Downs and Small, 1980) with central city decline being identified as a diseconomy of 
urbanization. More recently, Brueckner and Helsley (2011) have developed a dynamic urban model to 
show that sprawl and urban blight can be considered the byproduct of the same underlying economic 
process, both phenomena being responses to fundamental market failures distorting the socially desired 
                                                 
1
  According to data provided by the U.S. Census, between 1990 and 2000 the metropolitan population outside 
central cities grew by 22.96 percent; whereas the population of central cities grew by only 8.84 percent. Significantly, 
during this period, around 40 percent of central cities actually experienced population decline. As a result, in 2000, 
40.4 percent of the metropolitan population lived outside the central city, an increase from 37.5 percent in 1990. 
2
  The growing body of literature on the economics of urban sprawl is surveyed in Glaeser and Kahn (2004) and 
Nechyba and Walsh (2004). See also Ewing (1997), Burchell (1998), Sierra Club (1998), Cullen and Levitt (1999), 
Downs (1999), Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2003, 2008) and Brueckner and Largey (2008) for a review of the 
consequences of sprawl. 
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 allocation of population and urban land within jurisdictions3. Unpriced traffic congestion, open-space 
externalities, and unpriced suburban infrastructure make suburban living cost inefficient, drawing 
residents away from the central city and resulting in excessive suburban population. This population shift 
in turn depresses housing prices in the centre, undermining incentives to maintain or reinvest in existing 
downtown structures. 
 
 In this context, the adoption of corrective growth management policies may help curb sprawl and 
the decline of central cities by raising reinvestment and reducing urban blight4.Traditionally, land-use 
regulations (such as zoning ordinances or minimum lot sizes) have been the tool most frequently used to 
limit the excessive growth of cities. Adoption of land-use regulations is justified on the basis of both the 
quantity of development and the price of development (Helsley and Strange, 1995). That is, such policies 
aim to limit negative externalities of urban growth, prevent sprawl and guarantee a fair distribution of the 
tax burden generated by urban growth. They have, however, potentially adverse social and economic 
effects. Land-use regulations have a considerable impact on land and housing prices, as they tend to 
increase housing prices while lowering the value of vacant land (Brueckner, 2000). Besides, land-use 
regulations are blamed for exacerbating the problem of affordable housing while enhancing the 
exclusionary problem of ethnic and racial minorities and the deterioration of city centers (Fisher, 1942; 
Downs, 1999; Pendall, 2000; Quigley et al., 2004; Chakraborty et al., 2010)5. Overall, these undesired 
outcomes have reduced the popularity of these policies in favor of more appropriate anti-sprawl measures. 
In this context, newly designed urban containment policies (hereinafter, UCPs) have emerged in response 
to the perverse consequences of restrictive land-use controls.  These policies combine regulations and 
incentives to guide and efficiently allocate new development as well as to balance the forces of 
decentralization and promote the revitalization of communities. As explained in Nelson et al. (2004), they 
are explicitly designed to limit the development of land outside a defined urban area, while encouraging 
the development of infill sites and the redevelopment of inner core areas. To that end, they can combine 
mixed-use and high-density zoning, affordable housing strategies and land supply monitoring, with 
capital investment plans and various redevelopment incentives6. 
 
 While there has been extensive discussion of city and suburban growth, little attention has been 
paid to growing concerns about the blight in U.S. cities and the effectiveness of corrective anti-sprawl 
policies on preventing the deterioration of downtown structures. In fact, there are only a few studies 
                                                 
3
  According to the authors, urban development due to traditional fundamental forces (population growth, 
rising real incomes and falling commuting costs) cannot be faulted as inefficient, unless certain market failures distort 
their operation. In such a situation, the “invisible hand” fails to allocate resources in a socially desirable manner, so as 
to maximize aggregate economic welfare, leading to excessive spatial growth of cities (see also Brueckner 2000, 
2001). 
4
  Brueckner and Helsley (2011) refer to price-based policies to correct sprawl-inducing market failures, i.e. 
congestion tolls, open-space amenity taxes and impact fees. Nonetheless, the authors show that the introduction of 
quantity-based policies, such as urban growth boundaries, could also lead to an efficient overall equilibrium 
(including the level of reinvestment in central-city buildings). 
5
  See also Quigley and Rosenthal (2005), Glaeser et al. (2006), Malpezzi (1996), Shen (1996), Levine (1999), 
Ihlanfeldt (2004), Thorson (1997), Mayer and Somerville (2000) or Glaeser and Ward (2009) for empirical evidence 
on the consequences of land-use regulations in the U.S. Cooley and LaCivita (1982), Engle et al. (1992), Sakashita 
(1995), Brueckner (2000), Brueckner and Lai (1996), Helsley and Strange (1995), Bento et al. (2006) and Schone et 
al. (2011), among others, are examples of theoretical research regarding growth control modeling. 
6
  See Section 3.2. for further details on UCPs. 
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 analyzing the impact of different urban containment programs on the size (Wassmer, 2006) and the 
spatial structure of metropolitan areas (Woo and Guldmann, 2011), on residential segregation (Nelson et 
al., 2004), and on central city construction activity (Nelson et al., 2004b), i.e. the effect on both housing 
supply and central city housing prices. There is not, however, any empirical evidence for the success of 
policy remedies in preventing central city deterioration. Generally speaking, a review of the literature 
leads to the conclusion that the evidence for the extent of city blight, and for policy-oriented decision-
making aimed at addressing the problem of central city urban decline, remains somewhat limited. 
 
 Therefore, the present study seeks to add to the existing empirical literature on the relationship 
between central city and suburban development and the role played by anti-sprawl policies. It represents, 
as such, the first attempt in the empirical literature to address blight reduction in U.S. central cities. 
Moreover, the conclusions derived from this analysis should help orient public policy in terms of regional 
and local land-use decision-making and central city revitalization. 
 
 Our initial aim is to develop an accurate measure of urban blight so that we might empirically test 
whether the adoption of anti-sprawl policies can help reduce urban decay. Available micro data from the 
American Housing Survey on external conditions of buildings and neighborhoods enable us to construct 
detailed blight measures at the city level for a representative sample of 125 metropolitan areas. We report 
a novel empirical analysis of the determinants of city blight and of the role of corrective policies in 
preventing central city deterioration. Our empirical specification includes a number of control variables 
that take into account the effect of socioeconomic and housing characteristics at the city level. Having 
controlled for these effects, we are then in a position to identify the specific impact of more stringent anti-
sprawl policies adopted at the metro-level, proxied here by the adoption of UCPs, on city blight. In other 
words, we can determine whether among metropolitan areas with the same characteristics the ones with 
UCPs in place have experienced significant blight reductions in their central cities. Besides, the possible 
endogeneity problem of such policies is considered and the baseline model is re-estimated using two-
stage least squares.     
 
 The article is organized as follows. In the next section we provide an overview of the concept and 
measurement of urban blight. In the third section we describe the methodology, data sources and variables 
used in carrying out our empirical analysis. Our main results and their implications are discussed in the 
fourth section and several robustness checks are presented in the fifth section. Finally, in the last section, 
we conclude. 
 
2. Urban blight 
 
2.1. The causes of blight  
 
 As noted above, economic progress and major structural changes to transport systems and 
government policy, among others, have fostered urban sprawl, setting up the economic and social 
4
 conditions for urban decay of central cities. Fisher (1942) notes that the accelerating population shift 
toward the suburbs has accentuated the problem of the central city areas, given that suburban expansion 
responds mainly to the migration of central city residents rather than to the accommodation of new 
population growth. As Breger (1967) explains, urban blight is a diseconomy of urbanization as it arises 
from the causal forces that commonly relate to economic progress and urban growth (i.e. changing land 
use and technological change, rising social standards and the progressive over-utilization of property).  
 
 A new approach to the examination of the relationship between city and suburban growth has 
recently been developed by Brueckner and Helsley (2011). Their claim is that blight is not a consequence 
of sprawl but rather the result of the inefficient allocation of population driven by the same market 
failures that generate sprawl. In other words, the market mechanism has not functioned properly in the 
urban economy, resulting in an inefficient allocation of population between the inner city and the suburbs. 
Several sprawl-inducing distortions to the urban economy (unpriced traffic congestion, failure to account 
for the amenity value of open space, and average – rather than marginal – cost pricing of infrastructure) 
have resulted in excessive suburban population, with an inefficient loss of residents in the central zone. 
This population shift in turn depresses housing prices in the centre, undermining incentives to maintain or 
reinvest in existing downtown structures. This hypothesis is clearly supported by the U.S. data. Figure 1 
plots the share of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) population living in the suburbs in 2000 against 
the percentage of housing units built in the central cities during the period 1990-2000: the correlation, ρ= 
-0.36, is statistically different from zero. This result suggests that, as expected, the large population 
movements towards suburban locations are positively correlated to the decay of construction activity in 
central places. 
 
  
 This being the case, the adoption of anti-sprawl policies would also serve as a tool for blight 
reduction. The corrective mechanism works as follows. A corrective policy reduces sprawl, as it curbs 
downtown population shift toward the suburbs while encouraging suburban population to move toward 
the center. The resulting increase in housing prices in the center then acts as an incentive for building 
reinvestment and maintenance, thereby reducing urban decay (see Brueckner and Helsley, 2011, for a 
fuller explanation). Besides, Davis and Whinston (1961) use an example based on the Prisoner’s 
Own elaboration using data of U.S. Bureau of Census.
Figure 1. Correlation between sprawl and blight
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 Dilemma to show how the presence of neighboring effects and the property owners’ strategic behavior to 
maximize the returns to their investment can explain persistence in blight. According to the authors, 
property owners may neglect reinvestment and improvements in existing structures in anticipation of the 
arrival of more intensive uses which might bring capital gains. In this scenario, rational individual action 
might allow property to deteriorate and blight to occur, leading to a process of contagious neighborhood 
decline. Hence, as Brueckner and Helsley (2001) conclude, blight arises from the interaction of these 
neighborhood externalities and an event that causes an initial decline in building maintenance and 
reinvestment, identified by the authors as the natural operation of the land market in the presence of 
sprawl-inducing distortions. 
 
2.2. The blight measure 
  
Breger (1967, p.372) defines the concept of urban blight as follows: 
 
 “Urban blight designates a critical stage in the […] depreciation of real property beyond 
which its existing condition or use is unacceptable to the community […] This process 
appears to involve either functional depreciation (loss of productivity) or social 
depreciation (loss of prestige) or both”. 
 
Thus, while urban blight includes both social and economic dimensions, it is primarily a physical 
phenomenon. It involves the obsolescence, deterioration, the fall into disrepair and decay of buildings in 
central cities due, among other reasons, to neglect, depopulation, lack of economic support and deficient 
reinvestment in older central city properties. In this sense, recent papers define it as a spatial 
concentration of deficient housing maintenance or reinvestment in older central city properties (see 
Brueckner and Helsley, 2011, p.205; Bento et al., 2011, p.440). 
 
 In accordance with these definitions, the blight measures used in this paper are based on the 
physical characteristics of buildings drawn from the American Housing Survey (AHS), which is the 
largest, regular national housing sample survey in the United States. The survey collects data on the 
nation’s housing, including apartments, single-family homes, mobile homes, vacant housing units, 
household characteristics, income, housing and neighborhood quality, housing costs, equipment and fuels, 
size of housing units, and recent movers. National data are collected every other year, from a fixed 
sample of about 50,000 homes which has been scientifically selected to represent a cross section of all 
housing in the nation, updated each year to include new construction7.  
 
 We draw on available micro data files containing individual household responses to the survey 
questions to construct 11 different blight measures at the central city level. The survey identifies which 
units are located within the central city of each MSA (as defined by the Office of Management and 
Budget). Hence, all central city units are selected from the raw data and reweighed using the 
                                                 
7
  http://www.census.gov/housing/ahs/ 
6
 corresponding weights to obtain a representative sample of housing units within central cities of 125 
selected metropolitan areas8. Selected characteristics on external building conditions reflect serious 
damage to the structure mainly caused by continuous neglect, vandalism, and so forth, and refer to both 
the building itself and general neighborhood conditions. In particular, selected variables reflecting blight 
include: housing units with boarded up or broken windows; housing units with holes in the roof or with 
missing roof materials or surface roof sagging caused by extensive damage to the structure or serious 
neglect; housing units with outside walls missing the siding or bricks, with outside walls that slope, lean, 
slant or buckle; and housing units that have been abandoned or vandalized, trash or junk in streets or 
roads needing repairs, all within half a block. Descriptive statistics of the characteristics considered are 
presented in Table 1. Note that all variables are expressed as proportions of the total number of housing 
units. 
 
 
 A preliminary analysis of the blight data reveals two main findings. First, the frequency 
distributions presented in Figure 2 exhibit significant variations in the degree of blight in the central cities 
of the US. Second, the neighborhood condition variables present more marked indications of blight. For 
example, more than half the cities considered in the sample reported the need for road repairs and 
improvements in trash collection in neighboring streets. Moreover, as shown in Table 1, the mean values 
obtained after clustering cities according to the existence of anti-sprawl policies (i.e. UCPs) show that, as 
expected, blight levels are lower in cities without those policies in place. That is, a preliminary inspection 
of the data seems to support the hypothesis of the effectiveness of stringent anti-sprawl policies in 
preventing central city deterioration. Nonetheless, a regression-based analysis of the causes of urban 
                                                 
8
  The American Housing Survey public use file identifies housing units as being in central cities of 
metropolitan areas via the METRO3 variable. In order to obtain totals by MSA, we weighted our tabulations using 
WGT90GEO (employed instead of the pure weight, as the distribution of housing units across MSAs is of particular 
importance in our study). The geographical distribution of MSAs included in the blight sample is presented in Map 1 
of Appendix 1. 
Blight measure Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
External building conditions (windows, roof & walls):
Percent housing units with windows broken 5.71 0 24.43 3.93 0 13.57 6.55 0 24.42
Percent housing units with holes/cracks in foundation 3.75 0 30.93 2.71 0 7.95 4.37 0 30.94
Percent housing units with holes in roof 2.87 0 10.84 1.88 0 5.53 3.28 0 10.84
Percent housing units with roof missing shingles 5.08 0 19.39 3.84 0 10.41 5.63 0 19.39
Percent housing units with outside walls missing siding or bricks 4.45 0 26.55 2.39 0 8.2 5.29 0 26.55
Percent housing units with roof's surface sags or is uneven 3.07 0 17.57 2.11 0 8.22 3.57 0 17.57
Percent housing units with outside walls slope, lean, slant, buckle. 2.11 0 17.09 1.24 0 6.13 2.52 0 17.09
Neighbourhood conditions:
8.92 0 33.18 6.34 0 33.18 10.32 0 31.51
Percent housing units with trash or junk in streets in 1/2 block 14.61 0 41.68 13.84 9.42 33.42 15.6 0 41.68
Percent housing units with road within 1/2 block need repairs 38.26 9.42 75.96 32.38 9.42 44.37 41.99 13.46 75.96
Source: own elaboration based on the American Housing Survey micro data files.
Percent housing units with abandoned/vandalized buildings within 
1/2 block 
Table 1. Blight measures from the American Housing Survey, n=125 U.S. cities.
All cities Cities with UCP in place Cities without UCP
7
 blight is necessary to understand the observed differences. For this purpose, more robust conclusions 
from the econometric analysis are presented below.  
 
 
 
2.3. Principal Component Analysis  
 
 Given that the number of variables that proxy central city blight is high, we use a multivariate 
statistical technique to summarize all the available information in a smaller number of variables with 
minimum loss of information (Hair et al., 2010)9. The most common method for reducing dimensionality 
is the principal component analysis (PCA) as it creates uncorrelated components or factors, where each 
component is a linear weighted combination of the initial variables so that the first few components 
contain most of the variations in the original dataset.  
                                                 
9
  Further details on conducting the principal component analysis are presented in Appendix 2. 
External building conditions (windows, roof and walls):
Neighbourhood building conditions:
Own elaboration using data of the American Housing Survey.
Figure 2. Frequency distributions of selected blight measures.
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 Central city blight measures can be grouped into two different categories on the basis of their 
nature. We define a first group of external building conditions with reference to windows, roof and walls, 
and a second group of neighborhood conditions. PCA is then applied to each group of blight measures. 
The results allow us to identify one component in each group of variables that cover 47 and 65%, 
respectively, of the variance of the original data set (see Table 2)10.These two components are included in 
the regression analysis as dependent variables. As a result, two different equations are estimated, one for 
each component.  
 
 
 
 Table 3 shows the weights applied to each individual blight measure to obtain the retained 
component which is, as discussed above, a linear combination of the initial blight variables (Column 1). 
The results show the contribution of each blight measure to the component. For the first set of blight 
measures, all the variables are equally represented in the new blight index, as each variable explains 
between 10 and 17% of this newly created index. In the second set of blight measures, the three initial 
variables account for 35, 28 and 37% of the new blight index, respectively. The correlations between each 
initial blight measure and the retained component are presented in the last column of Table 3. As can be 
seen, the initial blight measures of neighborhood conditions are highly correlated to the new blight index 
(a coefficient around 0.8), whereas the correlation is somewhat weaker between external building 
conditions and their new summary indicator (a coefficient between 0.58 and 0.75).  
 
 
                                                 
10
  According to the Kaiser-Guttmann rule, only factors with an eigenvalue greater than one are retained. 
kmo measure 
(1)
Total % of variance Cumulative % Total % of variance Cumulative %
External building conditions: 0.8137
Component 1 3.3108 47.30 47.3 3.3108 47.30 47.30
Component 2 0.9602 13.72 61.02
Component 3 0.7952 11.36 72.38
Component 4 0.6475 9.25 81.63
Component 5 0.4689 6.70 88.33
Component 6 0.4599 6.57 94.90
Component 7 0.3572 5.10 100
Neighbourhood building conditions: 0.6547
Component 1 1.9387 64.62 64.62 1.9387 64.62 64.62
Component 2 0.6433 21.44 86.07
Component 3 0.4179 13.93 100
Notes: (1) The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was performed so as to test whether the partial correlations among variables are small. It provides an
index -between 0 and 1- of the proportion of variance among the variables that might be common variance. A value of the index in the .90s is
‘marvellous’, in the .80s ‘meritorious’, in the .70s ‘middling’, in the .60s ‘mediocre’, in the .50s ‘miserable’ and below .5 ‘unacceptable’(Kaiser,
1974). Our analysis gives values of 0.81 and 0.65, respectively, indicating that the sampling adequacy was greater than 0.5 and therefore satisfactory.
The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was conducted and the null hypothesis of uncorrelated variables (i.e., the correlation matrix is the identity matrix) was
rejected, indicating that the blight sample is adequate for PCA.
Table 2. Principal Components Analysis for blight measures
Initial eigenvalues Extraction sums of squared loadings
9
  
 
 Figure 3 presents the frequency distributions obtained for the two indexes of blight obtained after 
PCA11. The results suggest that the new blight indexes exhibit a similar pattern of variation to those 
presented in Figure 2 for single blight measures. 
 
 
 
3. Empirical framework 
 
3.1. The sample  
 
 The empirical study is based on a sample of 105 selected MSAs and their corresponding central 
cities12. The MSA was chosen as the unit of analysis for several reasons. As explained in Woo and 
                                                 
11
  The geographical distribution of the two blight indexes across central cities in MSAs included in the sample 
is presented in Maps 2 and 3 of Appendix 1. 
Weights 
(eigenvectors)
Contribution 
of each 
variable to 
the 
component
Correlation 
between each 
variable and 
the 
component
External building conditions (windows, roof & walls):
Percent housing units with windows broken 0.3233 0.1045 0.5883
Percent housing units with holes/cracks in foundation 0.3569 0.1274 0.6494
Percent housing units with holes in roof 0.3995 0.1596 0.7269
Percent housing units with roof missing shingles 0.3880 0.1505 0.7060
Percent housing units with outside walls missing siding or bricks 0.4121 0.1698 0.7498
Percent housing units with roof's surface sags or is uneven 0.4126 0.1702 0.7508
Percent housing units with outside walls slope, lean, slant, buckle. 0.3434 0.1179 0.6248
Neighbourhood conditions:
0.5961 0.3553 0.8299
Percent housing units with trash or junk in streets in 1/2 block 0.5256 0.2763 0.7318
Percent housing units with road within 1/2 block need repairs 0.6069 0.3683 0.8450
Source: own elaboration after PCA.
Percent housing units with abandoned/vandalized buildings within 1/2 
block 
Table 3. Weights, contributions and correlations between the blight measures and the components retained.
Source: own elaboration after PCA.
Figure 3. Frequency distributions of new blight measures
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 Guldmann (2011), Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) have to be discarded because 
they often extend across more than one state and they are, therefore, too large to capture the influence of a 
single central city. On the other hand, MSAs are metropolitan areas (MAs) surrounded by non-
metropolitan areas. Since MSAs do not closely interact with other MAs, the impacts of UCPs can be 
measured effectively within each MSA. 
 
 The sample size was not randomly chosen but rather determined by the availability of data. As 
discussed, blight measures were only available for a representative sample of 125 central cities, and urban 
containment data used to test whether more stringent anti-sprawl policies help to reduce city blight was 
available for just 105 of these. As shown in Table 4, a comparison of this sample with the universe of 
U.S. MSAs in 2000 indicates that large MSAs are over-represented in the sample. The mean population 
of the sample was 1,707,982 in 2000, while the mean population of all MSAs was 719,222. However, the 
sample does not differ significantly from other MSAs in terms of median household income, 
unemployment rate, population growth or income growth between 1990 and 2000. Besides, the MSAs 
included in the sample account for about 80 percent of the total MSA population. Thus, we believe that 
the sample data are reasonably representative of all MSAs in the U.S. 
 
 
 
3.2. Empirical specification  
 
 In this section, we describe the empirical strategy adopted for assessing the influence of UCPs on 
city blight reduction. To this end, the relationship between the variables of interest is assumed to be as 
follows: 
 
,2000 ,1970 2000 1990 ,1990Blight  UCP  X Blight εji j k j i j ji ijα β φ−= + + +  (1) 
 
                                                                                                                                               
12
  The U.S. Office of Management and Budget defines an MSA as a geographic entity containing a core urban 
area population of 50,000 or more. Each MSA consists of one or more counties and includes the counties containing 
the core urban area, as well as any adjacent counties that have a high degree of social and economic integration (as 
measured by commuting to work) with the urban core. The central city is defined as the principal city with the largest 
population within the MSA. Thus, the remaining principal cities of the MSA, if any, are considered suburbs. 
Selected characteristics Sample MSAs MSA population
Total population 1990 153,940,911  192,727,000
Total population 2000 181,046,096 225,982,000
Average population 1990 1,452,272 818,546
Average population 2000 1,707,982 719,222
Population growth 1990-2000 18.83% 14%
Median household income 1990 31,076 32,086
Median household income 2000 44,482 41,789
Median household income growth 1990-2000 43.13% 30.24%
Unemployment rate 2000 4.06% 4.1% 
Table 4. Comparisons of the sample MSAs with the MSA population
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 and 2000 Census of Population and Housing.
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 Where 
,2000jiBlight  is the value of the blight measure j in city i in 2000, j=1,2, ,1990jiBlight is the initial 
level of blight, UCPjt  is the urban containment policy in place prior to the period of analysis in metro 
area k, 
,1990Xi is a vector of city and metro characteristics in 1990, ,j jβ φ are the coefficient vectors and 
ε
ij is the error term. 
 
 Therefore, we analyze the correlation between the adoption of urban containment programs 
between 1960 and 2000 and city blight levels in 2000, and whether this correlation is robust to the 
inclusion of the initial blight level in 1990 and a set of control variables. Thus, the main purpose of our 
empirical analysis is to explore the long-run impacts that result from the implementation of UCPs so as to 
obtain an overview of the correlation between growth containment and city blight in the context of a 
monocentric city model. In fact, alternative model specifications presented in the Additional Results 
section reinforce this idea, as the year of adoption of the UCP does not have a significantly different 
impact on blight reduction in statistical terms.   
 
 Urban containment policies. In order to test whether the reduction of blight in central cities is 
correlated to the presence of more stringent anti-sprawl policies, we first introduce the urban containment 
policy variable. These policies combine regulations and incentives to guide and allocate efficiently new 
development as well as to balance the forces of decentralization and to promote the revitalization of 
communities. They are explicitly designed to contain urban development within a planned urban area, 
while encouraging redevelopment of inner core areas that might otherwise be neglected. In other words, 
such corrective policies are intended to curb downtown population shift toward the suburbs while 
encouraging the suburban population to move toward the center. The preservation of open space, cost-
efficient construction and the use of urban structure are among their intended goals also. 
 
 Thus, the measure used in this analysis is a categorical variable that takes on a value of one if an 
UCP was in place prior to 2001 in each of the MSAs considered. The data, provided by Nelson et al. 
(2004), are drawn from a nationwide survey of metropolitan planning organizations in order to identify 
the existence of a formally adopted containment policy in each MSA. Although UCPs can include a wide 
variety of tools to shape metropolitan growth, this survey focuses on the adoption of urban growth 
boundaries, service extension limits and greenbelts. This data comprises a representative sample of the 
whole population. Thus, the set includes observations for 331 MSAs in 50 different states, 102 of which 
adopted a UCP between 1960 and 2000. As shown in Figure 4, MSAs with a UCP in place are located 
mainly along the east and west coasts of the country, with just a few located in the interior. The data also 
report the year of adoption of the UCP: twenty-two out of the 102 MSAs adopted a UCP before 1980, 38 
did so during the 80s, 35 during the 90s and only one in the year 2000. In addition, a distinction can be 
drawn between areas with region-wide containment programs (i.e., all counties contained) and areas with 
containment programs in place within a subset of the region’s jurisdictions: forty-nine out of 102 MSAs 
formally adopted region-wide UCPs, while 53 adopted containment programs within a subset of the 
region’s counties. When merging this sample with our blight data we obtain a sample of 107 MSAs, 36 of 
12
 which have formally adopted a UCP. Note that contained areas were equally distributed according to the 
decade of adoption. Moreover, in half of the cases all counties were contained (see Table 5)13. 
 
 
 
 A lagged measure of blight is included in the equation to account for the initial level of central city 
deterioration. Given that data on central city blight are not available for the year 1990, we proxy them 
with the proportion of new housing units built between 1980 and 199014. 
 
 
 
 Next, a set of controls are added to the econometric specification to check for the robustness of the 
correlation between blight and the adoption of a UCP. This set of variables includes a variety of 
                                                 
13
  Detailed UCP maps according to the year of adoption and the type of containment program in place are 
presented in Appendix 1. 
14
  The correlation coefficient between the blight level in 2000 and the proportion of housing units built between 
1990 and 2000 has a value of around 0.4. Thus, the proportion of housing units built between 1980 and 1990 is 
expected to be a good proxy of the city blight level in 1990. 
Figure 4. Metrolopiltan Statistical Areas included in the UCP sample
Source: own elaboration using TIGER/Line Shapefile, U.S., Metropolitan Division National., provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Geography
Division. Data provided by Nelson et al (2004)
Notes: in blue MSAs that adopted UCP prior to 2000; in grey those MSA without UCP in place.
Original sample (n=331) Our sample (n=107)
MSAs without UCP: 229 71
MSAs with UCP: 102 36
According to the year of adoption:
Adopted in the 60s-70s 28 12
Adopted in the 80s 38 11
Adopted in the 90s 35 13
Adopted in 2000 1
According to the type of UCP:
Metro UCP 49 17
Submetro UCP 53 19
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 5. Urban Containment Policies
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 observable city and metropolitan area characteristics drawn from the U.S. Bureau of Census (Decennial 
Census, the three-year estimates of the American Community Survey, the City and County Data Book 
and the Bureau of Justice Statistics) and seek to account for the other main factors affecting the level of 
central city blight. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.  
 
 
 
 First, we control for several socioeconomic characteristics that influence the demand for housing 
in the city center. We include the population living in the central city and their median household income 
in 1990. The former indicates the strength of the central city and, therefore, its attractiveness as a place of 
residence and its ability to influence development patterns; the latter indicates residents’ demands and 
tastes and, as such, it accounts for the effect of the resources on the demand for housing quality.  
 
 Second, we add a set of variables that account for the quality of life in central cities. This group of 
variables includes the city crime rate, measured as the weighted average of the number of violent crimes 
per 1,000 of population, and the proportion of the central city population that is Black and Hispanic in 
1990. These variables could help explain population shift towards the suburbs as residents vote with their 
feet and choose their location within an urban area depending not only on their income and transports 
costs, but also according to their preferences. In this context, inner city problems lead middle-class 
residents to move to the suburbs, so that they form separate homogeneous communities of individuals of 
like income, education or race. Hence, we expect a positive correlation between this set of quality of life 
variables and the level of central city blight. The expectation, as such, is that the greater the occurrence of 
what residents are likely to view as negative factors in a central city, the greater the flight from blight we 
Name Mean (SD) Min Max
Urban Containment Programm in place prior to 2000 0.3277 
(0.4713)
0 1
Initial level of blight (% housing units built 1980-1990) 13.4739 
(9.0111)
1.5996 39.7966
Central city population, 1990 451,243 
(826,818)
49,178 7,322,564
Central city median household income, 1990 26,026.92 
(4,823.5)
16,925 46,206
Percent central city population hispanic, 1990 10.6281 
(15.3505)
0 76.8522
Percent central city population black, 1990 22.0704 
(17.6074)
0.8462 75.6746
0.05609 
(0.0491)
0.0013 0.2453
Federal aid  (in 1,000 $) per 100 of the population in 
central cities, 1990
4.6056 
(5.6183)
0.0001 26.2941
Source: own elaboration
Crime rate: weighted average crimes per 1,000 of the 
population in central cities, 1990
Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics
14
 can expect to see: thus, the higher the crime rate, and the higher the proportion of Black and Hispanic 
residents, the greater the level of blight. 
 
 Additionally, per capita federal expenditure is added to the model specification so as to examine 
whether federal spending in central cities contributes to the vitality of the cities and, hence, to blight 
reduction (Woo and Guldmann, 2011).  
 
3.3. Partial correlations  
 
 Figure 5 shows the raw correlation between our two indexes of central city blight in 2000 and the 
adoption of UCPs. As can be seen, MSAs with UCPs in place prior to 2000 exhibit lower levels of central 
city blight than those that were uncontained. This result holds for both indexes of blight, external building 
conditions and neighborhood conditions. In both cases, the correlation with the UCP variable is 
statistically different from zero at the 99 percent level, with coefficients around -0.33 and -0.27, 
respectively. Moreover, the level of central city blight is also correlated to the initial level of blight 
(measured here as the percentage of new housing units built during the 80s): the lower the initial level of 
central city blight, the lower the level of blight in 2000. 
 
 
 
 Up to this juncture, we have provided evidence for a negative correlation between UCPs and 
central city blight. However, as explained at the beginning of this discussion, blight can also be correlated 
with sprawl as they are driven by the same process, both being responses to fundamental market failures 
Source: own elaboration after PCA.
Figure 5. The correlates of central city blight.
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 distorting the socially desired allocation of population and urban land within jurisdictions (Brueckner and 
Helsley, 2011). Accordingly, the adoption of UCPs should also correlate with lower levels of sprawl in 
the MSAs under consideration. As shown in Figure 6, there is a clear correlation between central city 
blight (measured as our index of blight after introduction of the PCA) and suburban sprawl, proxied here 
as population density (inhabitants/urbanized land). Those MSAs with higher population densities (i.e. the 
ones with least sprawl) face lower levels of central city blight. Hence, the higher the level of central city 
deterioration, the higher is the level of sprawl in that MSA.  
 
 
 
4. Main results and policy implications 
 
 The regression-based results of the empirical model are provided in Table 7. The analysis tests 
whether the adoption of UCPs leads to lower blight levels in central cities, ceteris paribus. Following the 
PCA applied to the set of blight measures (see Section 2), two separate regression analyses are presented. 
The two panels, labeled External building conditions and Neighborhood building conditions, represent 
the two indexes obtained after the PCA. For the sake of clarity, a linear transformation has been applied 
to each index so as to take values on the interval (0,100).  
 
 Note that the econometric specification implemented enables us to identify the specific correlation 
between UCP and blight, since we are able to isolate the effects of other city level characteristics by 
introducing the set of control variables discussed above. In other words, we are now in a position to 
compare cities with the same characteristics in order to see if those that underwent containment 
experienced a reduction in blight. 
 
 Columns (1) to (4) report the estimated coefficients from different model specifications according 
to expression (1). In Column (1) only the UCP variable is included; in Column (2) we add the initial level 
of central city blight; in Column (3) a set of control variables is also added to the model, as given by 
expression (1); and, finally, in column (4) we add regional dummies for large regions (Northeast, South, 
West and Midwest – the latter being the omitted category) to capture all other region-specific 
unobservable characteristics. To aid comparison across variables, we report standardized coefficients that 
measure the absolute change in the blight index for a one standard deviation change in each explanatory 
variable. 
Figure 6. Correlation between sprawl and urban blight
Own elaboration. Blight (PCA) is the blight index obtained after PCA (external building conditions)
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 Consistent with a priori expectations derived from economic theory (see Brueckner and Helsley, 
2011), the regression findings show that the adoption of more stringent anti-sprawl policies help to reduce 
the deterioration in central city structures. U.S. central cities within contained metropolitan areas, 
measured here by their adoption of UCPs, have lower blight levels than those within metropolitan areas 
without UCPs in place. It is also interesting to note that this result holds for the two indexes of blight. 
Unless estimated coefficients are always negative, as expected, they are only statistically significant for 
the index of external building conditions (panel a). In this case, cities with a UCP in place have seen 
average declines in their blight index of approximately six points. As shown in panel b, no significant 
effects were found in the neighborhood building conditions index. Besides, the estimated results show 
that the initial level of blight, proxied here as the percent of new housing units built between 1980 and 
1990, helps to reduce the current level of blight. In other words, the higher the proportion of new housing 
units built in the past and, hence, the lower the level of initial blight, the lower the level of central city 
blight in 2000. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of new housing built in 
the 80s yields a four-point decrease in the first blight index considered. The impact on the second blight 
index (neighborhood conditions) ranges from three to seven points, depending on whether regional 
dummies are included or not.  
 
 We now turn to the interpretation of the results obtained for the set of control variables included in 
the baseline model given by expression (1) and presented in Columns (3) and (4). In general, all the 
estimated coefficients present the expected sign; however, some are found not to be statistically 
significant. First, richer central cities experience less blight than their poorer counterparts. A one standard 
deviation increase in the median household income of central cities results in an approximately four to 
five point decrease in the blight indexes. Second, Table 7 also shows the negative impact of central city 
population on blight. However, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is quite small and it does not 
have a statistically significant impact on city blight. 
 
 The results obtained for the variables accounting for the flight from blight are in accordance with 
the theory, as they exhibit a clearly positive influence on the level of central city blight. A one standard 
deviation increase in the percent of central city population that is Hispanic increases the blight index of  
external building conditions by around three points, while a one standard deviation increase in the percent 
of black population living in central places increases the blight index of neighborhood building conditions 
by between six and eight points. Higher central city crime rates have an unmistakable positive impact on 
blight in all the specifications considered. As shown in Table 6, a one standard deviation increase in this 
variable yields an increase in the blight index that ranges from three to five points.  
 
 The amount of per capita federal aid received has a significant impact on the level of central city 
blight. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in this variable reduces the blight index of external 
building conditions by three points. Thus, the results indicate that federal spending in central cities 
contributes to their vitality and, hence, to blight reduction. 
17
  
 Finally, note that when regional dummies are added to the econometric specification (Column (4)) 
the results hold for all variables considered (in terms of magnitude and significance), except the impact of 
UCPs on the neighborhood conditions index, which becomes clearly insignificant. 
 
 
  
All in all, these results are useful for obtaining a general overview of the influence of a certain type of 
corrective anti-sprawl policy on a desired target variable, namely the prevention of central city 
deterioration. Besides, the explanatory capacity of the model is considerably high (between 0.35 and 
0.50) and consistent with results obtained elsewhere in the literature. 
 
5. Additional results 
 
 We explore the sensitivity of our results in a number of different ways. First, the data provided 
by Nelson et al. (2004) allow us to differentiate between two types of UCP on the basis of their scope. 
Specifically, a distinction can be established between areas with region-wide containment programs and 
those with containment programs in place within a subset of the region’s jurisdictions (see Table 5 in 
Section 3). Based on the results presented in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8, no consistent effects were 
found15. Second, urban containment was measured on the basis of the existence of a formally adopted 
containment policy (growth boundary, service extension limits or greenbelt) prior to the start of the study 
                                                 
15
  A t test on the linear combination of the estimated coefficients of these variables was performed. The null 
hypothesis was not rejected, indicating that the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically different 
from zero. 
Dependent variable:
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban Containment Policy -13.98*** -12.84*** -6.974** -5.808* -11.47*** -7.586** -0.667 1.589
(3.018) (3.085) (3.228) (3.362) (3.450) (3.257) (3.320) (3.365)
Initial level of blight -4.833*** -4.660** -4.178** -10.30*** -7.452*** -3.182*
(1.833) (2.039) (2.019) (1.732) (1.734) (1.786)
Central city population, 1990 -1.486 -1.333 0.297 -0.891
(1.190) (1.253) (1.064) (1.081)
central city median household income, 1990 -5.219** -4.901** -3.887** -4.836***
(2.205) (2.261) (1.751) (1.814)
Percent central city population hispanic 2.475 3.212* 0.589 1.157
(1.831) (1.901) (1.543) (1.403)
Percent central city population black 0.608 0.511 5.861*** 8.364***
(2.753) (2.925) (2.146) (2.211)
Percent central city crime rate 3.905* 3.866* 3.268* 4.992**
(2.064) (2.161) (1.844) (1.914)
Per capita federal aid, central city -3.201** -2.721* -0.0727 -0.641
(1.352) (1.490) (1.359) (1.344)
Regional dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes
Constant 33.03*** 39.96*** 62.37*** 63.99*** 44.50*** 58.28*** 60.92*** 57.59***
(2.411) (3.942) (12.50) (11.97) (2.428) (3.716) (10.67) (10.58)
R-squared 0.110 0.177 0.315 0.338 0.070 0.311 0.505 0.557
Notes: (i) * Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level, ** Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level, *** Significantly different from
zero at the 99 percent level; (ii) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7. Estimation results of urban containment effect on central city blight.
External building conditions Neighbourhood building conditions
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 period in 2001. In addition, the availability of the year in which the UCPs were introduced can be used to 
test the proposition that their effects would be more pronounced the longer the programs had been in 
operation. To this end, we perform additional estimations including three categorical variables that take a 
value of 1 whether the UCP was adopted in the 70s, 80s and 90s, respectively. As shown in Columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 8, the regression results indicate that the year of adoption of the UCP does not have a 
statistically significant different impact on blight reduction. This finding is in line with Nelson et al. 
(2004), who analyzed whether UCPs have an impact on the level of central city construction activity and 
provided evidence of no consistent effects of program length. The estimated coefficients of this set of 
control variables are very similar to those presented in the previous section (see Table 7) and, therefore, 
no further comments are presented here. 
 
 
 
 
6. Robustness checks 
 
6.1. An alternative measure of blight: an average of the initial blight variables  
 
Dependent variable:
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban Containment Policy:
metro UCP -12.77*** -5.572* -10.09*** 0.0538
(3.465) (3.140) (3.262) (3.717)
submetro UCP -12.89*** -5.990 -5.325 2.774
(3.661) (4.632) (4.459) (4.367)
UCP_70s -13.49*** -7.177 -10.86** 0.719
(4.159) (4.927) (4.362) (4.630)
UCP_80s -12.68*** -1.498 -5.420 4.599
(4.215) (4.856) (4.274) (4.524)
UCP_90s -12.35*** -7.106* -6.219 0.616
(3.777) (3.883) (4.965) (4.041)
Initial level of blight -4.832** -4.175** -4.848** -4.461** -10.32*** -3.202* -10.44*** -3.373*
(1.842) (2.032) (1.881) (2.120) (1.725) (1.800) (1.766) (1.867)
Central city population, 1990 -1.342 -1.191 -0.831 -0.790
(1.267) (1.277) (1.105) (1.102)
central city median household income, 1990 -4.855** -5.176** -5.134** -5.036***
(2.345) (2.600) (2.014) (1.886)
Percent central city population hispanic 3.212* 3.119 1.159 1.087
(1.913) (1.984) (1.376) (1.395)
Percent central city population black 0.533 0.117 8.220*** 8.087***
(2.968) (3.031) (2.250) (2.263)
Percent central city crime rate 3.869* 4.029* 4.972*** 5.111***
(2.175) (2.195) (1.879) (1.879)
Per capita federal aid, central city -2.749* -3.025* -0.456 -0.857
(1.589) (1.628) (1.381) (1.367)
-8.640 -8.523 9.128 9.634
Regional dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 39.95*** 63.75*** 39.98*** 66.23*** 58.32*** 59.15*** 58.48*** 59.19***
(3.962) (12.39) (4.015) (13.67) (3.720) (11.62) (3.771) (11.11)
Observations
R-squared 0.177 0.338 0.177 0.343 0.315 0.558 0.315 0.560
Notes: (i) * Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level, ** Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level, *** Significantly different from zero at
the 99 percent level; (ii) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 8. Estimation results of urban containment effect on central city blight (UCP by type and year of adoption), n=105
c. Neighbourhood building conditionsa. External building conditions
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  As explained in Section 2, the dataset used in the present paper consists of a variety of central city 
blight measures capturing different aspects of central city building conditions. The statistical technique 
applied to the data is clearly the most suitable, as it is able to summarize all the information available into 
a smaller number of variables with the minimum loss of information. By so doing, the index thus 
obtained accounts for the co-variation shared by the original variables and, as such, this should be a better 
estimate than simple or weighted averages of the initial blight measures. Nonetheless, in this section we 
define an alternative measure of blight as the average of all the variables considered. The results are 
presented in Table 9. The results are in line with those presented in Table 7, albeit they present the lowest 
magnitudes of all the coefficients. The impact of the UCP ranges from a one to three point decrease in the 
average level of central city blight, although this effect disappears once the regional dummies are 
included in the model. As for the set of controls, all present the expected sign but record a magnitude of 
around one in almost all cases. These results may well reflect the lower capacity of the average measure 
of blight as a variable for summarizing adequately the information contained in the initial blight 
measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2. An alternative measure of anti-sprawl policies: the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index  
 
 As discussed in the introduction, UCPs are newly designed policies that have emerged in response 
to the perverse consequences of traditional restrictive land-use controls. The policies combine regulations 
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban Containment Policy -2.714*** -2.196*** -0.905* -0.540
(0.549) (0.523) (0.525) (0.579)
Initial level of blight -1.556*** -1.250*** -0.769**
(0.293) (0.319) (0.319)
Central city population, 1990 -0.0873 -0.189
(0.190) (0.202)
central city median household income, 1990 -0.873*** -0.928***
(0.318) (0.342)
Percent central city population hispanic 0.164 0.307
(0.243) (0.244)
Percent central city population black 0.554 0.789*
(0.429) (0.457)
Percent central city crime rate 0.846** 1.015***
(0.338) (0.368)
Per capita federal aid, central city -0.370* -0.371*
(0.202) (0.223)
Regional dummies No No No Yes
Constant 9.273*** 11.40*** 13.76*** 13.60***
(0.422) (0.665) (1.908) (1.912)
R-squared 0.129 0.308 0.483 0.504
Table 9. Estimation results of urban containment effect on average central city blight, n=105.
Notes: (i) * Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level, ** Significantly different from zero at the 95
percent level, *** Significantly different from zero at the 99 percent level; (ii) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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 and incentives to guide and efficiently allocate new development as well as to balance the forces of 
decentralization and promote the revitalization of communities. To achieve this, they might combine 
mixed-use and high-density zoning, affordable housing strategies and land supply monitoring, with 
capital investment plans and various redevelopment incentives. As such, they appear to be the most 
suitable growth control policies for addressing the problems of central city blight.  
 
 However, the recent empirical literature of growth controls includes an alternative measure of anti-
sprawl policy, the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (hereinafter, WRLURI) developed in 
Gyourko, Saiz and Summers (2008). The authors use a nationwide municipal survey of land use 
regulation, the 2005 Wharton Regulation Survey, to produce a number of indexes that summarize 
information on different aspects of the regulatory environment and capture the intensity of local growth 
control policies in a number of dimensions16. These indexes are then compiled in a single aggregate 
measure (the WRLURI) by means of factor analysis. Saiz (2010) processes the original municipal-based 
data to create average regulation indexes by metropolitan area using the probability sample weights 
developed by Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008). Lower values in the Wharton Regulation Index 
indicate a less restrictive or more laissez-faire approach toward real estate development. Metropolitan 
areas with high index values conversely tend to implement zoning regulations or operate project approval 
practices that constrain new residential real estate development.  
 
 This measure is not entirely appropriate for the present study for two main reasons. First, as it 
captures the overall regulatory environment, it encompasses many regulations that are not directly related 
to the control of sprawl. Second, the regulations considered in the index are mainly those of traditional 
land-use regulation (zoning ordinances and minimum lot sizes), but they do not explicitly address high-
density zoning, affordable housing strategies, land supply monitoring, capital investment plans or any 
other redevelopment incentive to promote downtown revitalization. These shortfalls prevented us from 
using the index as the main growth control policy in this paper. Nonetheless, the significant correlation of 
the WRLURI with the UCP variable (around 0.5) means it can be considered a plausible alternative 
measure of growth control management for the following reason. Measures considered in the WRLURI 
are not explicitly designed to prevent urban decay and promote central city revitalization, but it is also 
true that blight reduction could emerge as an indirect byproduct of those policies. Thus, and while being 
aware of its limitations, we use the WRLURI to perform further estimations of the baseline model for a 
robustness check. The results are presented in Table 10. 
 
                                                 
16
  These dimensions include: the degree of involvement by various local actors in the development process; 
state-level legislative and executive branch activity pertaining to land use regulation; state court involvement and the 
degree of deference to municipal control (based on the tendency of appellate courts to uphold or restrain four types of 
municipal land-use regulations: impact fees and exactions, fair share development requirements, building moratoria, 
and spot or exclusionary zoning); local zoning approval; local project approval; local assembly (measures direct 
democracy and captures whether there is a community meeting or assembly before which any zoning or rezoning 
request must be presented and voted up or down); supply restrictions (reflects the extent to which there are explicit 
constraints on supplying new units to the market); density restrictions in the form of minimum lot size requirements; 
and exactions required to developers to pay their allocable share of costs of any infrastructure improvement 
associated with new development. See Gyourko et al. (2008) for further details. 
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 As expected, the impact of the WRLURI on central city blight reduction is lower than that 
obtained with the UCP. As noted above, the difference in these results is attributable to their respective 
policy designs. The UCPs are explicitly designed to control blight and promote central city revitalization 
while the regulations that form part of the WRLURI are concerned with controlling sprawl, yet indirectly 
their implementation could have a positive, if unintentional, effect on central city blight reduction. 
 
6.3. Addressing the possible endogeneity problem of growth control programs  
 
 In this section we account for the fact that the relationship between UCPs and blight might be 
bidirectional. That is, since central cities with higher levels of urban decay in previous years are more 
likely to adopt policies to contain urban blight, containment programs may affect and be affected by the 
initial level of central city blight. Although we control for this possibility to some degree by restricting 
the definition of the presence of UCPs to those MSAs that adopted policies prior to the study period (year 
2000), any correlation between lagged city blight and current blight levels would reintroduce the problem. 
In order to address this potential endogeneity problem, we estimate our baseline model by means of two-
stage least squares (TSLS).  
 
 Thus, we need to find a group of variables correlated to UCPs but which are not related to the level 
of central city blight. In this regard, a review of the literature suggests that locations with the most 
desirable amenities tend to be the locations that are most closely regulated (see, for instance, Hilber and 
Robert-Nicoud, 2010; Saiz, 2010). Given that people prefer to live in nice places, locations endowed with 
desirable amenities are developed earlier and it is quite likely that land-use regulations have to be 
Dependent variable:
Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
WRLURI -7.752*** -7.273*** -5.357*** -4.244* -1.780 -0.870 2.234 1.008
(2.080) (2.015) (2.034) (2.547) (2.359) (2.063) (1.781) (2.020)
Initial level of blight -5.783*** -5.007** -3.477* -10.99*** -7.166*** -3.000
(1.876) (2.080) (2.091) (1.782) (1.801) (1.914)
Central city population, 1990 -0.868 -1.035 0.348 -0.747
(1.200) (1.276) (1.058) (1.122)
central city median household income, 1990 -5.730** -5.816** -4.496** -4.878**
(2.210) (2.286) (1.770) (1.868)
Percent central city population hispanic 3.494* 4.005** 0.173 1.083
(1.806) (1.854) (1.604) (1.352)
Percent central city population black 0.918 1.491 5.934*** 8.518***
(2.826) (3.067) (2.203) (2.366)
Percent central city crime rate 3.667 3.930* 3.079 4.432**
(2.307) (2.363) (2.091) (2.034)
Per capita federal aid, central city -3.200** -3.017* -0.170 -0.715
(1.501) (1.610) (1.463) (1.494)
Regional dummies No No No Yes No No No Yes
Constant 28.72*** 37.40*** 62.26*** 63.97*** 40.19*** 56.70*** 63.90*** 58.65***
(1.995) (3.842) (12.92) (12.24) (2.082) (3.747) (10.90) (11.00)
R-squared 0.083 0.164 0.322 0.337 0.004 0.292 0.498 0.547
Table 10. Estimation results of the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index on central city blight, n=102.
External building conditions Neighbourhood building conditions
Notes: (i) * Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level, ** Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level, *** Significantly different from zero 
at the 99 percent level; (ii) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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 instrumented to limit excessive urban growth and   preserve those locations. Saiz (2010) also reports that 
growth management programs correlate with the fraction of unavailable land within each MSA, 
calculated by combining the area corresponding to steep slopes, oceans, wetlands, lakes and other water 
features. Intuitively, this variable is correlated with UCPs since MSAs with a greater proportion of 
unavailable land are more likely to be interested in adopting containment programs to limit urban 
expansion. Likewise, this variable is unlikely to be correlated with the current level of city blight because 
it has been exogenously determined.  
 
 In addition, political ideology is also assumed to play an important role in determining the 
strength of preferences for environmental preservation (Kahn, 2011) and, hence, for promoting stronger 
growth management programs (Nelson et al., 2004; Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2010). The degree of 
fragmentation in a region’s planning system could potentially result in development competition in fringe 
areas, promoting low density suburbanization (Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2002; Carruthers, 2003; 
Wassmer, 2008). As Carruthers (2002) notes, the political fragmentation of regions is also responsible for 
fostering sprawl and blight because, by dividing authority among many small local governments, the 
overall ability of land-use planning to shape the outcome of metropolitan growth is undermined. In other 
words, a high number of local government units within the MSA tends to weaken coordination of land-
use policies, facilitating suburban development while contributing to downtown deterioration. Thus, 
efforts aimed at promoting jurisdictional cooperation and regulatory consistency across metropolitan 
areas are central to the efficacy of growth management programs.  
 
 Consequently, the set of variables selected as instruments for the UCP are the following. First, 
local amenities are proxied by the average heating and cooling degree days, a coastal dummy and the 
percentage of land unavailable for development provided by Saiz (2010). Second, the influence of 
political ideology is proxied here by the state share of votes cast in favor of the Democratic candidate in 
the 1976 presidential election. Third, political fragmentation is measured as the number of counties within 
each MSA. Finally, the homeownership rate in 1990 is also included as an instrument, to account for the 
fact that homeowners favor regulations to raise their property values and, therefore, locations with a large 
share of homeowners can be expected to be more regulated (Fischel, 2001). 
 
 We run a first-stage regression where the possible endogenous variable, UCP, is regressed on the 
set of instruments explained above plus the other control variables in the model (given by expression (1)). 
The predicted variable is then included in a second-stage regression as an independent variable in the 
original regression equation. The regression results of equation (1) with the UCP being treated as the 
endogenous variable are provided in Table 11. Column (1) reports the first-stage estimated coefficients of 
our instruments. The results show that the democratic vote share, the mean heating degree days and the 
percentage of land unavailable for development are particularly useful in our attempts to identify the 
effects of the UCP on blight. On the one hand, liberal voters are probably more interested in conservation 
issues and, thus, more likely to be interested in adopting UCPs to curb urban sprawl. On the other, local 
amenities play an important role in explaining the regulatory environment. First, the higher the percentage 
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 of land unavailable for development, the higher is the level of regulation required to limit urban 
expansion. Second, the mean heating degree days capture a city’s extremely hot climate. This is a 
characteristic that makes open space less attractive and, in turn, less closely correlated with sprawl and 
the need for stronger growth management programs, as shown by the negative sign of its estimated 
coefficient.  
 
 
 
Finally, the level of fragmentation, the homeownership rate, the mean cooling degree days and the coastal 
dummy present the expected sign, although they are not significant. However, when considered together, 
the set of instruments is jointly significant17.Column (2) reports the TSLS results for the external building 
conditions index. The TSLS coefficient for the UCP variable is negative and significant. The coefficient 
                                                 
17
  The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions was performed after the first-stage estimation and the null 
hypothesis of valid instruments was not rejected (see Table 3.11). 
First-stage
Dependent variable: External building 
conditions
Neighbourhood 
building conditions
Explanatory variables:
Urban Containment Policy (instrumented) -17.76** -3.871
(9.158) (7.594)
Initial level of blight 0.0508 -3.311 -7.022***
(0.0932) (2.103) (1.718)
Central city population, 1990 -0.0360 -0.901 0.943
(0.0396) (1.437) (1.305)
Central city median household income, 1990 0.0903 -5.633* -4.449
(0.101) (3.396) (2.892)
Percent central city population hispanic -0.116 1.855 0.543
(0.0824) (1.864) (1.408)
Percent central city population black -0.0455 -0.041 5.346**
(0.0736) (2.827) (2.153)
Percent central city crime rate -0.0469 3.292 2.870*
(0.0617) (2.061) (1.749)
Per capita federal aid, central city 0.0179 -3.095** 0.167
(0.0483) (1.614) (1.492)
Instruments:
Share democratic vote, 1972 0.0134***
(0.00418)
Fragmentation -0.0481
(0.0628)
Homeownership rate, 1990 0.00770
(0.0515)
Mean heating degree days -0.153**
(0.0763)
Mean cooling degree days -0.0407
(0.124)
Coastal dummy 0.172
(0.167)
Percent unavailable land 0.10021*
(0.0528)
Constant -0.229 66.67*** 63.73***
(0.717) (16.34) (14.88)
R-squared 0.313 0.232 0.470
Sargan test 3.2048 10.0972
F-Statistic 7.43
Table 11. Instrumental Variables approach
Notes: (i) * Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level, ** Significantly different from zero at the 95
percent level, *** Significantly different from zero at the 99 percent level; (ii) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Second-stage
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 is higher than that provided by OLS (see Table 7), confirming the presence of a downward bias. Based on 
this result, contained cities exhibit an index of central city blight that is 17 points lower than the index 
presented by their uncontained counterparts. As for our set of controls, all the coefficients present the 
expected sign and a very similar magnitude to those obtained for our OLS specifications (see Table 7), 
albeit only the income and federal aid variables remain significant. The results for the neighborhood 
conditions index are presented in Column (3). Once again, the impact of the UCP is negative, as expected, 
but not significant. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
 US post-war suburbanization has reshaped the spatial pattern of growth in many metropolitan 
areas, in a process that has seen population and employment shifting toward the suburbs and the urban 
decay of central cities. A body of research has been built up concerned with policy remedies aimed at 
curbing such sprawl and fostering more compact urban developments. One of its main theoretical 
conclusions is that city blight is in fact a byproduct of anti-sprawl programs, as they not only limit urban 
growth but provide incentives to redirect population growth and investment away from the suburbs 
toward neglected inner core areas (Brueckner and Helsley, 2011). 
 
 The fact that city blight is only a recent phenomenon means the current discussion on its causes 
and potential remedies remains largely undeveloped. In fact, empirical evidence on city blight and the 
effectiveness of anti-sprawl policies on preventing the deterioration of downtown structures remains 
limited. Several studies have analyzed the impact of growth management programs on sprawl (Wassmer, 
2006; Woo and Guldmann, 2011) and central city revitalization (Dawkins and Nelson, 2003; Nelson et 
al., 2004). Nonetheless, these studies focus on population, employment and construction activity to proxy 
central city status rather than a measure of blight per se. Unlike existing research, the present study 
represents the first attempt to analyze the impact of anti-sprawl policies, proxied by adopting metro-level 
urban containment programs, on city blight, defined here as the physical deterioration of downtown 
structures. Micro data drawn from the American Housing Survey allow us to construct 12 specific blight 
measures based on the external physical characteristics of buildings and neighborhoods for 125 U.S. 
central cities. For the sake of simplicity, these details of city blight are summarized in a smaller number 
of variables with the minimum loss of information by means of principal component analysis. Thus, we 
end up with three different variables that are included as dependent variables in the regression analysis. 
Our empirical specification enables us to determine the specific impact of UCPs on the level of blight in 
central cities, with all other metropolitan and city characteristics affecting urban blight being taken into 
account by the inclusion of a set of control variables. Our results indicate that the adoption of UCPs has a 
significant impact in terms of the reduction of blight in these contained cities. As such, we are able to 
report empirical evidence of urban containment programs achieving one of their intended goals, that of 
the reduction of central city deterioration. In this regard, it is worthwhile noting also the non-negligible 
role played by upper tiers of government, as per capita federal aid also contributes to blight reduction and 
central city revitalization.  
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 Finally, the importance of a central city to the regional economy should not be underestimated. In 
this regard, blight reduction can generate positive externalities that enhance growth and economic 
progress beyond a city’s boundaries. Several studies have empirically addressed this research question. 
As noted in Voith (1998), suburbs also benefit from investment and the subsequent revitalization of 
downtowns, as city income growth in turn enhances suburban growth. A further example is provided by 
Muro and Puentes (2004), who report evidence of the relationship between lower city poverty rates and 
metropolitan income growth. 
 
 Therefore, the evidence seems to suggest that central cities and their suburban areas remain closely 
interconnected18. This being the case, central city revitalization and metropolitan area development 
should perhaps be seen as complements rather than substitutes. This would mean that cities and suburbs 
alike could improve their welfare through cooperative containment programs aimed at curbing sprawl and 
fostering more compact urban developments while preventing urban decline in city core areas. 
 
8. References 
 
Baum-Snow, N. (2007) Did highways cause suburbanization? Quarterly Journal of Economics 122: 775-
805 
Bento, A.M.; Franco, S.F.; Kaffine, D. (2006) The efficiency and distributional impacts of alternative 
anti-sprawl policies. Journal of Urban Economics 59: 121-141 
Bento, A.M.; Franco, S.F.; Kaffine, D. (2011) Welfare effects of anti-sprawl policies in the presence of 
urban decline. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 40 (3): 439-450 
Bradbury, K.L.; Downs, A.; Small, K.A. (1980) Some dynamics of central city-suburban interactions. 
American Economic Review 70: 410-414 
Bradford, D.F.; Kelejian, H.H. (1973) An econometric model of the flight to the suburbs. Journal of 
Political Economy 81: 566-589 
Breger, G.E. (1967) The concept and causes of urban blight. Land Economics 43 (4): 369-376 
Brueckner, J.K. (2000) Urban Sprawl: Diagnosis and Remedies. International Regional Science Review 
23: 160-171 
Brueckner, J.K. (2001) Urban Sprawl: Lessons from Urban Economics. In: Gale, W.G., Pack, J.R. (Eds.): 
Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, pp. 65-89.   
Brueckner, J. K.; Fansler, D. (1983) The Economics of Urban Sprawl: Theory and Evidence on the 
Spatial Sizes of Cities. Review of Economics and Statistics 65: 479–482 
Brueckner, J. K.; Helsley, R.W. (2011) Sprawl and blight. Journal of Urban Economics 69: 205-213 
Brueckner, J.K.; Largey, A.G. (2008) Social Interaction and Urban Sprawl. Journal of Urban Economics 
64: 18-34  
Brueckner, J.K.; Lai, F. (1996) Urban growth controls with resident landowners. Regional Science and 
Urban Economics 26: 125-143 
Burchell, R.W.; Shad, N.A.; Listokin, D.; Phillips, H.; Downs, A.; Seskin, S.; Davis, J.S.; Moore, T.; 
Helton, D.; Gall, M. (1998) The Costs of Sprawl. Revisited. Transit Cooperative Research Program 
(TCRP) Report 39, Transportation Research Board, Washington. 
Burchfield, M.; Overman, H.; Puga D.; Turner, M. (2006) Causes of Sprawl: A Portrait from the Space. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(2): 587-633 
Carruthers, J.I. (2002) The impacts of state growth management programmes: a comparative analysis. 
Urban Studies 39 (11): 1956-1982 
                                                 
18
  See Ihlanfeldt (1995) for a review of the empirical evidence pointing to the sources of interdependence 
linking the economies of central cities and their suburbs. 
26
 Carruthers, J.I. (2003) Growth at the fringe: the influence of political fragmentation in United States 
metropolitan areas. Papers in Regional Science 82: 475-499 
Carruthers, J.I.; Ulfarsson, G.F. (2002) Fragmentation and Sprawl: Evidence from interregional analysis. 
Growth and Change 33: 312-340 
Carruthers, J.I.; Ulfarsson, G.F. (2003) Urban sprawl and the cost of public services. Environment and 
Planning B: Planning and Design 30: 503-522 
Carruthers, J.I.; Ulfarsson, G.F. (2008) Does Smart Growth Matter to Public Finance? Evidence from the 
United States. Urban Studies 45 (9): 1791-1823 
Chakraborty, A.; Knaap, G.; Nguyen, D.; Shin, J.H. (2010) The effects of high-density zoning on 
multifamily housing construction in the suburbs of six US metropolitan areas. Urban Studies 47 
(2): 437-451 
Cooley, T.F.; LaCivita, C.J. (1982) A theory of growth controls. Journal of Urban Economics 12: 129-
145 
Cullen, J.B.; Levitt, S.D. (1999) Crime, urban flight and the consequences for cities. Review of Economics 
and statistics 81: 159-169 
Davis, O.A. (1960) A pure theory of urban renewal. Land Economics 36: 220-226 
Davis, O.A.; Whinston, A.B. (1961) The economics of urban renewal. Law and Contemporary Problems 
26: 105-117 
Dawkins, C.J.; Nelson, A.C. (2003) State growth management programs and central-city revitalization. 
Journal of the American Planning Association 69 (4): 381-396 
Downs, A. (1999) Some realities about Sprawl and Urban Decline. Housing Policy Debate 10 (4): 955-
974 
Engle, R.; Navarro, P.; Carson, R. (1992) On the theory of growth controls. Journal of Urban Economics 
32: 269–283 
Ewing, R. (1997) Is Los Angeles-style sprawl desirable? Journal of American Planning Association 63: 
107-126 
Fischel, W.A. (2001) The homevoter hypothesis. How home values influence local government taxation, 
school finance, and land-use policies. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press 
Fisher, E.M. (1942) Aspects of zoning, blighted areas and rehabilitation laws. American Economic 
Review 32: 331-340 
Glaeser, E.L.; Kahn, M.E. (2004) Sprawl and Urban Growth. In: Henderson, J.V. and Thisse, J.F. (Eds): 
Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics, volume IV, pp.2498-2527. Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Glaeser, E.L.; Ward, B.A. (2009) The causes and consequences of land use regulation: evidence from 
Greater Boston. Journal of Urban Economics 65: 265-278 
Glaeser, E.; Schuetz, J.; Ward, B. (2006) Regulation and the rise of housing prices in Greater Boston. 
Pappaport Institute for Greater Boston, Cambridge, CA, Harvard University and Pioneer Institute 
for Public Policy Research, Boston, MA. 
Gyourko, J.; Saiz, A.; Summers, A. (2008) A new measure of the local regulatory environment for 
housing markets: The Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index. Urban Studies 45(3): 693-
729 
Hair, J.F.; Black, W.C.; Babin, B.J.; Anderson, R.E. (2010) Multivariate data analysis. Prentice Hall, 7th 
edition. 
Helsley, R.W.; Strange, W.C. (1995) Strategic growth controls. Regional Science and Urban Economics 
25: 435-460 
Hilber, C.; Robert-Nicoud, F. (2010) On the origins of land use regulations: theory and evidence from US 
metro areas. SERC Discussion Papers 0038, Spatial Economics Research Centre, London School 
of Economics 
Ihlanfeldt, K.R. (2004) Exclusionary land-use regulations within suburban communities: a review of the 
evidence and policy prescriptions. Urban Studies 41(2): 261-283  
Kahn, M.E. (2011) Do liberal cities limit new housing development? Evidence from California. Journal 
of Urban Economics 69: 223-228 
Levine, N. (1999) The effects of local growth controls on regional housing production and population 
redistribution in California. Urban Studies 36 (12): 2047-2068 
27
 Maplezzi, S. (1996) Housing prices, externalities and regulation in U.S. metropolitan areas. Journal of 
Housing Research 7(2): 209-241 
Mayer, C.J.; Somerville, C.T. (2000): Land use regulation and new construction, Regional Science and 
Urban Economics 30, 639-662. 
McGrath, D.T. (2005) More evidence on the spatial scale of cities. Journal of Urban Economics 58: 1-10 
McGuire, T.J.; Sjoquist, D.L. (2002) Urban Sprawl and the Finances of State and Local Governments. In 
State and Local Finances Under Pressure, Edward Elgar. 
Mieszkowski, P.; Mills, E.S. (1993) The causes of Metropolitan Suburbanization. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 7 (3): 135-147 
Mills, E.S.; Price, R. (1984) Metropolitan suburbanization and central city problems. Journal of Urban 
Economics 15: 1-17 
Muro, M.; Puentes, R. (2004) Investing In A Better Future: A Review Of The Fiscal And Competitive 
Advantages Of Smarter Growth Development, Brookings Institute. 
Nechyba, T.; Walsh, R. (2004) Urban Sprawl. Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (4): 177-200 
Nelson, A.C.; Burby, R. J.; Feser, E.; Dawkins, C. J.; Malizia E.; Quercia, R. (2004) Urban containment 
and central city revitalization. Journal of the American Planning Association 70: 411-425 
Nelson, A.C.; Dawkins, C. J.; Sanchez, T. W. (2004b): Urban containment and residential segregation: a 
preliminary investigation. Urban Studies 41 (2): 423-439 
Pendall, R. (2000) Local land use regulation and the chain of exclusion. Journal of the American 
Planning Association 66(2): 125-142 
Quigley, J.M.; Raphael, S.; Rosenthal, L.A. (2004) Local land-use controls and demographic outcomes in 
a booming economy. Urban Studies 41 (2): 389-421 
Quigley, J.; Rosenthal, L. (2005) The effects of land use regulation on the price of housing: what do we 
know? What can we learn? Cityscape 8(1): 69-137 
Saiz, A. (2010) The geographic determinants of housing supply, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(forthcoming). 
Sakashita, N. (1995) An economic theory of urban growth control. Regional Science and Urban 
Economics 25: 427-434 
Schone, K.; Koch, W.; Baumont, C. (2013) Modelling local growth control decisions in a multi-city case: 
do spatial interactions and lobbying efforts matter? Public Choice 154: 95-117 
Shen, Q (1996) Spatial impacts of locally enacted growth controls: the San Francisco Bay region in the 
1980s. Environment and Planning B 23: 61-91 
Sierra Club (1998) Sprawl: The dark Side of the American Dream. Sierra Club Sprawl Report 
Thorson, J.A. (1997) The effect of zoning on house construction. Journal of Housing Economics 6(1): 81-
91 
Voith, R. (1998) Do suburbs need cities? Journal of Regional Science 38 (3): 445-464 
Wassmer, R.W. (2006) The influence of local urban containment policies and statewide growth 
management on the size of United States urban areas Journal of Regional Science 46 (1): 25-65 
Wassmer, R. W. (2008) Causes of Urban Sprawl in the United States: Auto reliance as compared to 
natural evolution, flight from blight, and local revenue reliance. Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 27: 536–555 
Woo, M.; Guldmann, J. (2011) Impacts of urban containment policies on the spatial structure of US 
Metropolitan Areas. Urban Studies 48 (16): 3511-3536 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28
  
Appendix 1. Blight and urban containment program maps. 
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Appendix 2. Principal Component Analysis 
 
 Principal component analysis (hereinafter, PCA) is a multivariate statistical technique used to 
reduce the number of variables in a data set into a smaller number of ‘dimensions’. PCA can be applied 
with a set of correlated and quantitative variables in order to obtain a smaller number of uncorrelated 
variables, defined as linear combinations of the originals. The resulting principal components (hereinafter, 
PCs) or factors summarize the original set of variables with the minimum loss of information (Hair et al., 
2010).  
 
 In mathematical terms, from an initial set of p correlated variables, PCA creates uncorrelated 
components or factors, where each component is a linear weighted combination of the standardized initial 
variables. For example, from a set of variables X1 through to Xp,  
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where upp represents the weight for the pth principal component and the pth variable.  
 
 Initially, we have as many components as original variables (p). Nonetheless, only the subset of m 
components that explains the largest possible amount of variation in the original data is kept. Therefore, 
uncorrelated PCs are extracted by linear weighted transformations of the initial variables so that the first 
few PCs contain most of the variations in the original dataset.  
 
 The amount of information included in each component is summarized in its variance; that is, the 
higher the variance, the higher the amount of information incorporated in that component. The weights 
for each PC are given by the eigenvectors of the correlation matrix, or if the original data were 
standardized, the co-variance matrix. The variance (λ) for each PC is given by the eigenvalue of the 
corresponding eigenvector. These PCs are extracted in decreasing order of importance so that the first PC 
accounts for as much of the variation as possible and each successive component accounts for a little less, 
subject to the constraint that the sum of the squared weights is equal to one, that is to say the vector of 
weights is normalized19.  
 
Hence, the first component C1 is obtained by maximizing its variance  
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19  Because the first principal component accounts for the co-variation shared by all attributes, this may be a 
better estimate than simple or weighted averages of the original variables.  
 
32
  
Subject to the constraint 

	

   1 
 
 V(C1) is maximized with the highest eigenvalue λ of matrix V. Letting λ 1 be the highest eigenvalue 
of V and considering u1 as its associated normalized eigenvector (u1’u1=1), we have defined the vector of 
weights to be applied to the initial variables in order to obtain the first principal component, which can be 
defined as:  
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 The second component (C2) is orthogonal to (i.e. uncorrelated with) the first component, and 
explains additional but less variation than the first component, subject to the same constraint. Subsequent 
components are uncorrelated with previous components; therefore, each component captures an 
additional dimension in the data, while explaining smaller proportions of the variation of the original 
variables. Thus, PCA can be useful when there is a severe, high-degree of correlation present in the initial 
variables. Besides, the higher the degree of correlation among the original variables in the data, the fewer 
the number of components that are required to capture common information. Note that whenever the 
variables in the original dataset are uncorrelated, PCA can be discarded as the PCs obtained are equal to 
the original variables. 
 
 As the sum of the eigenvalues equals the number of variables in the initial data set, the proportion 
of the total variation in the original data set accounted for by each principal component is given by 
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When the variables are normalized, trace(V) = p, so that the proportion of the hth component on total variation is 
λ
 h/p.  
 
Once all coefficients uhj are computed, the values of the PCs for each individual observation in the sample 
of size n can be obtained as follows, 
 
#     ⋯ 		  h = 1,..., p    i = 1,..., n 
 
 How many components should be retained? The number of PCs to be retained can be determined 
by means of the arithmetic mean criterion. According to this criterion, only components with 
characteristic root (i.e., the variance of the component) above the average of all characteristic roots should 
be retained.  Analytically, this criterion implies retaining all components that satisfy the following expression:  
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 When standardized variables are used,  ∑ 	 = p, so that only components such that h >1 are 
retained. Thus, an eigenvalue greater than 1 indicates that PCs account for more variance than are 
accounted for by one of the original variables in the standardized data. This is commonly used as a cutoff 
point for retaining PCs. 
 
 Correlations between initial variables and the components. A clear and meaningful interpretation of 
the different components obtained after PCA is crucial to derive conclusions. In this regard, it is 
important to determine the weight of each original variable in the new component as well as the 
correlations between the variables and the components. As stated above, a component is a linear 
combination of a set of variables, but it could be better correlated to some of them than it is to others. The 
correlation coefficient between a component and one of the original variables is computed by multiplying 
the variable weight (eigenvector) by the square root of its eigenvalue:  
 
  '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